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Unconscious processing of invisible 
visual stimuli
Chen Song1,2,3,4 & Haishan Yao4
Unconscious processing of subliminal visual information, as illustrated by the above-chance accuracy 
in discriminating invisible visual stimuli, is evident in both blindsight patients and healthy human 
observers. However, the dependence of such unconscious processing on stimulus properties remains 
unclear. Here we studied the impact of stimulus luminance and stimulus complexity on the extent 
of unconscious processing. A testing stimulus presented to one eye was rendered invisible by a 
masking stimulus presented to the other eye, and healthy human participants made a forced-choice 
discrimination of the stimulus identity followed by a report of the perceptual awareness. Without 
awareness of the stimulus existence, participants could nevertheless reach above-chance accuracy 
in discriminating the stimulus identity. Importantly, the discrimination accuracy for invisible stimuli 
increased with the stimulus luminance and decreased with the stimulus complexity. These findings 
suggested that the input signal strength and the input signal complexity can affect the extent of 
unconscious processing without altering the subjective awareness.
Visual information outside of awareness can affect conscious experience1,2, motor response3,4, and even goal pur-
suit5,6. To understand the power and limits of subliminal visual information, it is necessary to address the degree 
to which supraliminal visual information can be processed. If observers can correctly “guess” the identity of visual 
stimuli despite being unaware of the stimuli, it is intuitive that such subliminal visual information may affect 
behavior in a fashion similar to the way supraliminal visual information influences behavior7. The unconscious 
processing of subliminal visual information has been reported in blindsight patients, who, due to the lesions in 
primary visual cortex, cannot consciously perceive visual stimuli in their defect visual field, but can nonetheless 
correctly discriminate the stimuli8. This unconscious processing of subliminal visual information is also evi-
dent in healthy human observers, where visual stimuli rendered invisible can be discriminated at above-chance 
accuracy9.
Despite these established dissociations between perceptual awareness and correct discrimination of visual 
stimuli, it remains unclear how the unconscious processing of invisible visual stimuli is dependent on the stim-
ulus properties. We suggest that the extent of unconscious processing may be affected by the strength and the 
complexity of the signal carrying subliminal visual information, which may in turn determine the degree towards 
which subliminal visual information can influence behavior. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence 
of stimulus luminance and stimulus complexity on the extent of unconscious processing. Using the paradigm of 
continuous flash suppression, we rendered a testing stimulus invisible by presenting it to one eye while presenting 
a masking stimulus to the other eye3,10. This created situations where the same testing stimulus was totally invis-
ible in some trials yet fully or partially visible in other trials2, possibly due to the fluctuations in cortical signal 
evoked by the testing stimulus.
Such induction of different perceptual awareness scales by the same physical stimulus allowed us to compare 
the discrimination accuracy between trials where the testing stimulus was invisible and visible, respectively. We 
found that in trials where the testing stimulus was invisible, participants could nonetheless reach above-chance 
discrimination accuracy. Based on this observation, we explored how the discrimination accuracy of invisible 
testing stimulus changed with the luminance and the complexity of the stimulus. To vary the stimulus complexity, 
we compared simple, low-level visual stimuli such as oriented grating11, with complex, high-level visual stimuli 
such as face or house12. We found that while the testing stimulus remained invisible, the discrimination accuracy 
increased with the stimulus luminance and decreased with the stimulus complexity. Our findings suggested that 
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the strength and the complexity of the signal carrying subliminal visual information can affect the extent of 
unconscious processing without altering the subjective awareness.
Material and Methods
Participants and Apparatus. Twelve healthy volunteers gave written informed consent to participate 
in this study that was approved by the Biomedical Research Ethics Committee of the Shanghai Institutes for 
Biological Sciences. The study and methods were carried out in accordance with the guidelines of the Biomedical 
Research Ethics Committee of the Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences and the guidelines of the declara-
tion of Helsinki. The participants were young adults (aged 19 to 25, 8 females, 4 males) with normal or correct-
ed-to-normal vision and no neurological history. Apart from one of the authors (CS), all participants were naive 
to the aims of this study and received payment for participation. The experiments were programmed in MATLAB 
using Psychtoolbox13 and conducted in a darkened room with the monitor providing the only significant source 
of light.
Stimuli and Procedure. We measured the discrimination accuracy of visual stimulus in conditions where 
participants were unaware, partially aware, or fully aware of the stimulus. For this purpose, we presented a 
low-luminance gray-scale testing stimulus to one eye and a high-contrast colorful mask to the other eye, while 
the eye-of-presentation was random and counter-balanced across trials. To test the influence of stimulus lumi-
nance and stimulus complexity, we conducted three separate experiments using simple or complex stimuli at 
one of five possible luminance levels. The testing stimulus was a gray-scale sinusoidal grating (spatial frequency: 
2.8 cycles per degree of visual angle) oriented at 45 degree towards left or right in experiment one, a gray-scale 
female face or house in experiment two, and a gray-scale happy or sad cartoon face in experiment three. The 
masking stimulus was a high-contrast colorful Mondrian pattern flashed at a frequency of 33.33 Hz in all three 
experiments.
The testing stimulus (size: 3 × 3 degree of visual angle) and the masking stimulus (size: 4 × 4 degree of visual 
angle) were presented in a black background on the two halves of a calibrated CRT monitor (Viewsonic P225, 
size 22″, spatial resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels, refresh rate of 100 Hz, viewing distance of 81.2 cm). To aid bin-
ocular convergence, each stimulus was placed in a white square frame (size: 4 × 4 degree of visual angle) with a 
red fixation cross at its center, and viewed through a mirror stereoscope with a chin rest. The testing stimulus and 
the masking stimulus were presented for 300 ms, after which the testing stimulus was replaced by the masking 
stimulus and the same masking stimulus was presented to the two eyes for 600 ms (Fig. 1). Following the stimulus 
offset, participants made an unspeeded two-alternative forced choice judgment as to whether the testing stimulus 
was a left-oriented or a right-oriented grating (experiment one), a face or a house (experiment two), and a happy 
or a sad face (experiment three). Participants then made an unspeeded perceptual awareness report as to whether 
the testing stimulus was seen clearly and discriminable (fully visible), or seen vaguely and un-discriminable (par-
tially visible), or not seen at all (invisible).
To control the physical differences between different testing stimuli, we adjusted them to have the same mean 
luminance and the same luminance distribution. Thus, any difference in discrimination accuracy was not the 
artifact of some testing stimuli being physically more similar and consequently less discriminable. The mean 
luminance of the testing stimulus was 4.75%, 9.5%, 19%, 28.5%, 38% of the maximum luminance of the monitor 
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of experimental paradigm. A low-luminance gray-scale testing stimulus 
presented to one eye was rendered invisible by a high-contrast colorful masking stimulus presented to the 
other eye. The testing stimulus was left/right oriented grating in experiment one, face/house in experiment two, 
and happy/sad cartoon face in experiment three. Participants made a two-alternative forced choice indicating 
the identity of the testing stimulus, followed by a perceptual awareness report indicating whether the testing 
stimulus was seen clearly and discriminable (fully visible), or seen vaguely and un-discriminable (partially 
visible), or not seen at all (invisible).
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(2.4 cd/m2, 4.8 cd/m2, 9.7 cd/m2, 14.5 cd/m2, 19.4 cd/m2). The mean luminance of the masking stimulus was 50% 
of the maximum luminance (25.5 cd/m2). For each experiment, participants completed 1250 trials that were 
divided into 5 blocks of 250 trials (5 luminance values x 50 trials). Within each experiment, the luminance and the 
identity of the testing stimulus was randomized but counter-balanced across trials. The order of the experiments 
was counter-balanced across participants.
Data Analysis. In each experiment, the trials of each luminance scale were divided into three sets where the 
testing stimulus was invisible, partially visible, and fully visible, respectively. For each of these sets, we calculated 
the discrimination accuracy (i.e., the percentage of correct answers), and the percent invisible (i.e., the percent-
age of trials in which the testing stimulus was invisible). The percent invisible reflected the effectiveness of the 
masking stimulus. It decreased with the luminance of the testing stimulus. In particular, the percent invisible for 
the five luminance levels was [96% ± 1.5%, 77% ± 2.1%, 54% ± 2.1%, 21% ± 2.7%, 11% ± 0.6%] (mean ± SEM) in 
experiment one, [98% ± 0.7%, 74% ± 2.3%, 49% ± 3.2%, 26% ± 3.1%, 12% ± 1.1%] (mean ± SEM) in experiment 
two, and [99% ± 0.5%, 75% ± 3.8%, 48% ± 1.9%, 22% ± 2.9%, 11% ± 0.8%] (mean ± SEM) in experiment three. 
This proximity in percent invisible across different testing stimuli (i.e., different experiments) allowed us to study 
the influence of stimulus complexity on the extent of unconscious processing.
Results
We performed a three-way analysis of variance test (ANOVA) with the stimulus visibility, the stimulus luminance, 
and the stimulus complexity as three factors-of-interest. We found that the discrimination accuracy of the testing 
stimulus varied with the stimulus visibility (F(2, 42) = 351.8, p < 10−13), the stimulus luminance (F(4, 40) = 75.9, 
p < 10−9), and the stimulus complexity (F(2, 42) = 15.7, p < 10−3). Moreover, the analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between the stimulus visibility and the stimulus luminance (F(8, 36) = 23.13, p < 10−6), as well as a 
significant interaction between the stimulus visibility and the stimulus complexity (F(4, 40) = 4.65, p < 0.05), but 
no interaction between the stimulus luminance and the stimulus complexity (F(8, 36) = 1.15, p = 0.39). These 
results suggested that both the luminance and the complexity of the testing stimulus influenced the discrimina-
tion accuracy, whereas the exact pattern of influence might differ across different conditions of stimulus visibility.
We therefore explored the exact dependency of the discrimination accuracy on the luminance and the com-
plexity of the testing stimulus, and addressed whether this pattern of dependency varied with the visibility of 
the testing stimulus. We first investigated how the overall discrimination accuracy changed with the visibility of 
the testing stimulus. We found that without awareness of the stimulus existence, participants could nevertheless 
reach above-chance accuracy (> 50%) in discriminating the testing stimulus, regardless of its luminance or com-
plexity (t-test; experiment one: t(11) = 44.2, p < 10−13; experiment two: t(11) = 35.1, p < 10−11; experiment three: 
t(11) = 57.1, p < 10−14). This discrimination accuracy of invisible testing stimulus, however, was significantly 
lower than the discrimination accuracy where the same testing stimulus was partially visible (t-test; experiment 
one: t(11) = 10.7, p < 10−6; experiment two: t(11) = 6.7, p < 10−4; experiment three: t(11) = 8.1, p < 10−5) or fully 
visible (t-test; experiment one: t(11) = 18.6, p < 10−8; experiment two: t(11) = 18.1, p < 10−8; experiment three: 
t(11) = 33.1, p < 10−11). Moreover, the discrimination accuracy of partially visible stimulus was lower than the 
discrimination accuracy of fully visible stimulus (t-test; experiment one: t(11) = 3.1, p < 0.01; experiment two: 
t(11) = 3.3, p < 0.01; experiment three: t(11) = 5.1, p < 10−3). These results suggested that participants could form 
unconscious knowledge of subliminal visual information, although not as accurate as the conscious knowledge 
of supraliminal visual information.
We then plotted the discrimination accuracy of the testing stimulus against the stimulus luminance and the 
stimulus complexity, separately for different conditions of stimulus visibility. In trials where the testing stimulus 
was partially or fully visible, we did not observe a significant dependency of the discrimination accuracy (aver-
aged across stimuli with different complexity) on the stimulus luminance (Fig. 2A; one-way ANOVA with FDR 
correction for multiple-comparison; partially visible, F(2, 33) = 4.1, p = 0.08; fully visible, F(2, 33) = 1.1, p = 0.81). 
Moreover, the discrimination accuracy (averaged across stimuli with different luminance) did not change signifi-
cantly from left/right oriented grating to face/house (Fig. 2B; t-test with FDR correction for multiple-comparison; 
partially visible, T(11) = 0.9, p = 0.36; fully visible, T(11) = 0.6, p = 0.81), or from left/right oriented grating to 
happy/sad cartoon face (Fig. 2B; t-test with FDR correction for multiple-comparison; partially visible, T(11) = 2.1, 
p = 0.09; fully visible, T(11) = 0.1, p = 0.91).
By contrast, in trials where the testing stimulus was invisible, the discrimination accuracy (averaged 
across stimuli with different complexity) increased with the stimulus luminance, even when the stimulus 
luminance changed mildly from level one to level three (Fig. 3A; one-way ANOVA with FDR correction for 
multiple-comparison; F(2, 33) = 17.8, p < 10−4). Moreover, the discrimination accuracy (averaged across stim-
uli with different luminance) decreased from left/right oriented grating to face/house (Fig. 3B; t-test with FDR 
correction for multiple-comparison; T(11) = 4.8, p < 10−3) or happy/sad cartoon face (Fig. 3B; t-test with FDR 
correction for multiple-comparison; T(11) = 5.8, p < 10−3). These results suggested that the extent of uncon-
scious processing was dependent on the strength and the complexity of the signal carrying subliminal visual 
information.
Discussion
Unconscious processing of subliminal visual information was first observed in blindsight patients7,14,15. Later on, 
by using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to create artificial scotoma16 or using binocular rivalry to ren-
der monocular stimulus invisible8, it was found that healthy human participants could also reach above-chance 
accuracy in discriminating invisible visual stimuli. Importantly, such subliminal visual information influences 
behavior in a fashion similar to the influenced exerted by supraliminal visual information. For example, sub-
liminal visual stimulus can induce visual illusion just as supraliminal visual stimulus does1,2,17. Moreover, the 
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Figure 2. Discrimination accuracy of visible testing stimulus. The discrimination accuracy of testing 
stimulus was plotted against stimulus luminance (A) and stimulus complexity (B), for trials where the 
testing stimulus was visible (including both partially visible and fully visible). ANOVA test and t-test with 
FDR correction for multiple-comparison were performed. The analysis revealed no significant change in 
discrimination accuracy with stimulus luminance, and no significant change in discrimination accuracy from 
left/right oriented grating to face/house or to happy/sad cartoon face. Error bars represent one SEM (N = 12).
Figure 3. Discrimination accuracy of invisible testing stimulus. The discrimination accuracy of testing 
stimulus was plotted against stimulus luminance (A) and stimulus complexity (B), for trials where the testing 
stimulus was invisible. ANOVA test and t-test with FDR correction for multiple-comparison were performed. 
The analysis revealed a significant increase in discrimination accuracy with stimulus luminance, and a 
significant decrease in discrimination accuracy from left/right oriented grating to face/house or to happy/sad 
cartoon face. Error bars represent one SEM (N = 12).
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influence of subliminal visual stimulus is not limited to low-level sensory domains but also evident in high-level 
cognitive domains, where subliminal stimulation of achievement-related words was found to influence goal pur-
suits and improve task performances3,5,6,18,19.
The widespread influence of subliminal visual information raises the question of what is its limit. One way to 
address this question is to test the extent towards which participants can unconsciously process subliminal visual 
stimulus. The extent of such unconscious processing is likely to be affected by the strength and the complexity 
of the signal carrying subliminal visual stimulus and may in turn indicate the degree towards which subliminal 
visual stimulus can influence behavior. As such, studying how the extent of unconscious processing depends on 
stimulus properties is an important step towards understanding unconscious processing of subliminal visual 
stimulus. Whereas the existence of unconscious processing of subliminal visual stimulus is well established, its 
dependence on stimulus properties remains unclear.
Here we explored how the extent of unconscious processing depends on the properties of subliminal visual 
stimulus. It is plausible that subliminal visual stimulus of different complexity or from different categories was 
processed by visual cortical regions at different hierarchical levels20,21,22. As such, we compared simple, low-level 
visual stimulus (e.g., oriented grating) with complex, high-level visual stimulus (e.g., face or house), in order to 
explore how the complexity of the signal carrying subliminal visual stimulus might affect the extent of uncon-
scious processing. Moreover, we used visual stimulus with different luminance23, in order to explore how the 
strength of the signal carrying subliminal visual stimulus might affect the extent of unconscious processing. We 
found that the extent towards which participants processed subliminal visual stimulus (i.e., the discrimination 
accuracy of invisible testing stimulus) increased with stimulus luminance and decreased with stimulus complex-
ity. These results suggested that the strength and the complexity of the signal carrying subliminal visual stimulus 
affected the extent of unconscious processing. It will be of interest for future studies to address, using neuroimag-
ing techniques, the exact cortical processing for subliminal visual information.
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